Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players

Levitt, Steven D., John A. List, and Sally E. Sadoff. 2011. "Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players." American Economic Review, 101(2): 975–90.
DOI:10.1257/aer.101.2.975

Abstract
Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. We analyze the play of world-class chess players in the centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing backward induction, and in pure backward induction games—Race to 100 games. We find that chess players almost never play the backward induction equilibrium in the centipede game, but many properly backward induct in the Race to 100 games. We find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games. (JEL C73)

Ungated Version

VoX Interview with Robert Aumann

Fascinating short interview with 2005 Nobel winner Robert Aumann on rationality, games and conflict - link here. Interesting discussion of the work of Kahneman and Tversky contrasted with that of Vernon Smith.

Yale Lectures on Game Theory

In a continuing example of the rather amazing trend of giving away whole lecture courses from elite institutions entirely free, Benjamin Polak's Yale lecture course on Game Theory is available below. For those who have done or are doing my behavioural economics course, I would particularly recommend Lecture 17 on ultimatums and bargaining.

http://academicearth.org/courses/game-theory

Stephen Kinsella on Matching in Labour Markets

Here is a theoretical (working) paper by Dr. Stephen Kinsella (from the University of Limerick) on matching in labour markets. Dr. Kinsella presented this paper yesterday at the Irish Economics Association. The matching process described can also be thought of as a mate choice problem, as discussed in the paper. We discussed the geographic distribution of single females to males in Ireland on the blog before, here.