http://ftp.iza.org/dp2778.pdf
a paper from the IZA above that shows for a wide range of econometric specifications that being born to a mother in her teens is associated with several worse outcomes for the child at ages 20 on. Obviously, the usual policy conclusion here is to adopt some mechanism to persuade people to delay fertility. The philosophers have made the case though that from the point of view of the children who are born, it probably is less important to them that their outcomes are slightly worse than it is that they exist at all. By delaying fertility the future mother should have better outcomes and the future child should have a better outcome than the child who would have been born sooner. However, the child born sooner now no longer exists. We have in a sense thrown one child off the life-raft on the basis of him/her being slightly less viable. in some sense, the child born sooner will never regret the fact that their parent did not delay fertility, assuming that their existence is valuable to them. Taking this to extremes, it doesnt matter how many children the mother has or when she has them - all these children will be glad that the decision was made.
I dont know if he ever addressed this particular topic but Derek Parfit's philisophical work examines a lot of these types of issues. I have read several ways of resolving this philosophical issue but it really does throw a bit of a spanner in the works. Worth having a read of this debate - some of the book is available on the link below. Shane Frederik's PhD thesis at MIT is linked below also and has some fantastic references
here
http://www.mit.edu/people/shanefre/Thesis_S.Frederick.pdf
4 comments:
Sounds like a good reason for not consulting philosophers, daft buggers.Its not whether the child regrets being born or even whether the parents regret having them. Lets us assume there is no regret in either case but in one case the child has better outcomes. Isn't it in society's interest to encourage that outcome either on a paternalistic basis or that resources are finite and these kids generate negative externalities?
i agree with the point but i wouldnt underestimate the challenge that these philosophical models pose to a lot of standard welfare economics. what some of the philosophical literature is trying to get at is that "the child" is not the same child. We have simply chosen a child with better outcomes over a child with worse outcomes. As you say, society is better off. However, the point is that this logic could be applied to living children as well if we just left it where you finished. There are also a lot of implications with regard to things like pre-screening in pregnancy. I haven't taken sides but they are very interesting arguments and philosophical reasoning does have a role to play.
I am afraid I just don't get it.Sure its a different child but there's a "veil of ignorance" (same as the argument used for helping the less well off) if we can influence which of two children come into being,it makes sense to encourage the one that has lower costs to society and probably has a more fulfilling life.
Maybe the issue is whether to have the child at all- I presume this is what the pre-screening argument is about. This raises "right-to-life" issues which I think are distinct not to mention tricky.
If one wants to take this argument down the philosopher's route (which is to take another step back and add the next fundamental query), then we don't even need to worry about whether we should influence which of the two children comes into being.
I suppose this because the philosophical literature has a tenuous basis if it is trying to suggest that "the latter child" is not the same child. We don't know this.
The "same child" could come into being, whether they arrive at one point in time or another. Sure, time will alter their circumstances. But circumstances will not alter a spiritual identity.
I'm not a fan of this type of progression in philosophical arguments though, as very little value tends to get added when one keeps stepping back and adding the next fundamental query. Thats why I like welfare economics and the notion of maximising welfare outcomes. It's "hands-on intellectual enquiry", maybe?
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