This Wiki page is quite interesting:
"The problem of the future's contingents is a logical paradox first posed by Diodorus Cronus from the Megarian school of philosophy, under the name of the "dominator", and then reactualized by Aristotle in chapter 9 of De Interpretatione. It was later taken on by Leibniz. It concerns the contingency of a future event. Deleuze used it to oppose a "logic of the event" to a "logic of signification". Diodorus' problem concerned the question: "Will there be a sea battle tomorrow?" According to this question, two propositions are possible: "yes, there will be a sea battle tomorrow" or "no, there will not be a sea battle tomorrow." This was a paradox in Diodorus' eyes, since either there would be a battle tomorrow or there wouldn't be one: according to the basic principle of bivalence (A is either true or false), one of the two proposition had to be right and therefore excluded the other. But this poses a problem, since the judgment on the proposition (whether it is right or wrong) can only be made when the event has happened. In Deleuze's words, "time is the crisis of truth" [1]. This problem thus concerns the ontological status of the future, and therefore of human action: is our future determined or not? The future, putting in stakes the category of possibility, here poses problems to logic which are discussed to the present time".
"The problem of the future's contingents is a logical paradox first posed by Diodorus Cronus from the Megarian school of philosophy, under the name of the "dominator", and then reactualized by Aristotle in chapter 9 of De Interpretatione. It was later taken on by Leibniz. It concerns the contingency of a future event. Deleuze used it to oppose a "logic of the event" to a "logic of signification". Diodorus' problem concerned the question: "Will there be a sea battle tomorrow?" According to this question, two propositions are possible: "yes, there will be a sea battle tomorrow" or "no, there will not be a sea battle tomorrow." This was a paradox in Diodorus' eyes, since either there would be a battle tomorrow or there wouldn't be one: according to the basic principle of bivalence (A is either true or false), one of the two proposition had to be right and therefore excluded the other. But this poses a problem, since the judgment on the proposition (whether it is right or wrong) can only be made when the event has happened. In Deleuze's words, "time is the crisis of truth" [1]. This problem thus concerns the ontological status of the future, and therefore of human action: is our future determined or not? The future, putting in stakes the category of possibility, here poses problems to logic which are discussed to the present time".
7 comments:
i feel a diatribe against philosophers coming up.
probability statements do the trick for me on this paradox.
Shall I start Liam? My only knowledge of Deleuze is the chapter devoted to him (& Guittari) in Sokal & Bricmont's book ("Intellectual impostures"). A generous interpretation is that Deleuze is a willful obscurantist but I am more inclined to the view that he is a pretentious charlatan.
I was intrigued with this lark that time is the crisis of truth, but I concur that probability statements do the trick for me on this paradox.
Whats more astounding is that years of paradoxology was only solved by the investigation of petty games of chance that led to the creation of "perhaps the most sublime branch of mathematical science - the theory of probabilities" (Jevons, 1970 edition, p.81).
My troublesome philosopher friend is wont to rave on about Deleuze (& Guittari). Your comment puts the rave in good perspective Kevin!
Personally I think aphorisms like "time is the crisis of truth" may sound good but are meaningless & give philosophy a bad name, stay away from all that Continental rubbish.Mind you, freakonomics gives economics a bad name.
Primarily, I'll admit I'm not intimately familiar with Deleuze, however, his proposition of time as the crisis of truth goes back as far as Parmenides, with time, change and knowledge; inability to know truthfully as things change over time. Which I would take as fundamental to Deleuze's point. What Deleuze appears to do, is to assimilate this notion into the fundamental human problem of knowledge and truth. (Which, incidentally I'd argue isn't rectified by probability-which is something I would admit to having serious issues with). Relevance to people as people, is the essence of Continental Philosophy. Kinda like, how I would see qualitative economics; an attempt to bring a discipline into a forum which acknowledges people as thinking, emotive beings, rather than just statistics. This would be in juxtapostion to entirely abstract theory, which I would argue a lot of rational philosophy, and neo-classical/washington consensus type economics, is. So, Kevin, the continental movement is to philosophy, what the qualitative movement aspires to be in economics; a humanising paradigm for a traditionally abstract science. Don't shun it, embrace it!
i somehow dont think that Kevin is going to be packing up the STATA manuals on this basis Brona! - good try!
My knowledge of continental philosophy is limited and mainly influenced by the work of Sokal & Bricmont hence my view of Deleuze, Derrida, Iriragay et al as obscurantists & charlatans. Economists don't deny that people are thinking, emotive beings or believe that they are "just statistics". Qualitative research,if done well, adds understanding but I don't see how continental philosophy adds anything (and certainly not relevance) since it goes out of its way to be obscure.This particular King is butt naked.
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